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Abstract

Anything as revolutionary as World War I could not help but convulse the social order. Within each state the
sense of community induced by the common war effort did not survive into the postwar world, with its
tensions old and new. Demobilized soldiers, trained to fight, found it difficult to adjust themselves to civilian
life. The uncertainties of war, revolution, and economic instability undermined confidence among individuals,
classes, and states. Only in a very narrow sense did the armistice of 1918 bring peace. [excerpt]
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An^hiJig..,ji^.myolut ojiarj as
help
but^c-oavulse, the social order' Within each state the sense of
community induced by the common war effort did not survive into
the postwar world, with its tensions old and new. Demobilized
soldiers, trained to fight, found it difficultJtq .adjust-themuncertainties of war, jrevol^
aiKi economic instability undermined confidence among_lndividuals,
classes, and statesr""On^
very narrow sense did the armisTice~"oT~ 1918 bring pe^ce„
Many traditional social anchors did not survive the war, or
suo^iiSar"^5IyTl^i~gre^ly"M
Provincial and reT igious
foyai iiiAK retreated further before the demands of the nationstate..
Age-oid" regimes and^dynasties disappeared. Traditional
"class lines ha5"~l)een blurEejd'when womefT'oTgentle birth worked
beside their workingclass sisters in munitions factories, while
their menfolk shared the common, dangers of the trenches, jjax
profiteers, fpmed a,jcJjass Qt '^
prising those who saw their inheritance^ and savings wiped out
by war, taxation, and inflation. The latter group represented
a grievous loss to Western Civilization because it was they who
had once provided much of its managerial, professional, and in
tellectual talent. Their thrift had accumulated much of its
capital and their allegiance had given liberalism its vitality.
Now, bitter and uncomprehending, the shabbily genteel were a
potentially dangerous element in society.
The steady expansion of urban centers continued. Thanks
to cheap transportation, especially the street railway, the
bus, and the automobile, the growth of Suburbia created a way
of life which was neither urban nor rural.
SiJon many workers
had to spend more time going from their homes to offices and
factories than their ancestors on the medieval manor had spent
trudging to their strips in the three field system.
Urbanization intensified that standardization of lif e
which was a concomitant of mass produc11on.
Ready-made clothes
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of a uniform style gave a monotonous appearance to urban crowds.
The movies, the radio, and the comic strip threatened to standardize entertainment as w^ll as more serious~~ineas~at
acceptAbie to Ake^maximum number 61' peopTe
,
In"tfajs
centiiry of the common man, heresy was difficult to sustainr
One result of two world wars, when jobs for women were
well-paid, socially respectable, and numerous, wa§.,the emanci
p a t i o n o f women from a number o f t r a d i t i o n a l r e s t r i c t i o n s 7 I t
is sar3~tBat wartime^elisTo'ns firsf made smoking fnr
nrceptable in polite societv«
The question of votes for women
nowTTpnTtio Wtmriilv
nnntfoversiaT:" TK6T"r6ceTv'ea t
franchise in Britain in 1918 and^i&^S and (for federal elec
tions) in the United States in 1920„
They were given the right
to,, own and r.oTitrol^jLtmlX-jamUjpxs^^ .
Their s^ial relati^^
with_jaeji„were Placed on a free and more nearly equal basis, as
illustrated by that symbol of the "roaring twenties," the flap
per.
Divorce laws bacame.. mQxa..Ienieiil„,aM.^^^^^^
rates rose.
S c o r e s o f new g a d g e t s and tcehtiig'ueo
f r o m mur .h o f ,
/the drudprp-ry r>f |ir>n<=!P>wn-rbBut emancipation led many to ex- |
press alarm at the fact that with the restrictions also dis-/
appeared many of the protections which had been woman's tra^^ional right.
In this world which was so truly revolutionary there were
still many who hoped for and expected in 1918 a return to what
President Warren G. Harding called normalcy.
By this was meant
a wosilxi—ia whii::jbt---4tae--fltes-t--desirable pre-1914 _values ^nd institutlojais.„.p.ersisted^ Optimists, ignoring postwar reality, were
encouraged by the apparent success with which a war fought by
the Allies avowedly "to make the world safe for democracy" had
indeed established numerous and supposedly democratic, repub
lican, and independent nation-states, and a League of Nations.
Especially in the United States, which tended to withdraw from
European affairs, technological advances and the boom years of
the 1920 s seemed to confirm their optimism,
denwcrajcd^S. b^^
the n^ tntai i
r'rfit ion of i n t e c n a t i
a t i n n s i n thp> 1
»c
ogtJ,m.ists and seemed to confirm those who had hfipin passimi.«ts
ever since the war„
Faith in the inevitability of progress
received a body 1)1 ow which hurt all the more because the be
lief that some sort of progress was possible was still widely
^^1*^°
politics, liberty received less attention than equal
i t y , and in_jjQjbernaJJ.on,a^^^
in nat4-ojftal.-..aaIJdetermination gavjLj^:££..JxL.-a-....a.ea^
national security.
Along with disillusion came in many cases a lack of will ,
ParticuTariy in ragaras to social questionsTmany men seemed to
have lost the capacity to think things out afresh and then rededicate themselves to the attainment of agreed goals.
Rather,
they seemed to await some cataclysm which they felt themselves
helpless to avert or control„
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Much criticism was leveled at those...£XcaJ4>s--^icJ^
prpylded„lIiiaEfISISZrT'OT7Ficians™^^parties were accused of
still fighting over issues of the last centuries, and with out
moded weapons at that.
Biographies and histories debunking men
and movements enjoyed a large sale.
A widely read book by a
rrenchman, Julien Benda (1867-1956), entitled The Betrayal of
the Intellectuals (1927) , accused intellprtnnls nf havlnp- de
fer ted their--±raj5A^ioRa-l--«A-»s.ijQX^ by:--Jxtlaing the masses in exalt in^2l£3.^ilal-pa».'5ions-,-^lA§§^assion , and nsTFTonai passions^." " (TEBirsthought it signif icant~That*''tfie title of one of the most
talked-about poems of the period was The Waste Land (1922), by
an American expatriate, T. S. Eliot (18887"!
A provocative expression of this malaise of the spirit was
Oswald Spengler's The Decline of the West, first published in
Germany in 1918. ITthin the framework of a cyclical theony of
hi stnry. Spengler interpreted the events of his day a^Jjnflicalr
ing the inevitable and TmmihenT"~destriictioliTof WestexiLJCiA«ild
tion.
Many readers had the uneasy"jfeel^
was right
when he predicted a collapse similar to that of GrecQ-Rpman
Civilization, this time with the barbarians within the frontiers.

